I. INTRODUCTION
In California v. Greenwood, 1 the United States Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment 2 does not prohibit the "warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home." 3 This Note explores the Greenwood opinions and concludes that the Court wrongly refused to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left for collection. This Note reasons further that the Court created a confusing and disturbing precedent by failing to sufficiently justify its conclusion that society does not recognize an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her trash receptacle, and by wrongly relying on the false presumption that a citizen voluntarily surrenders his or her trash to the collector. Finally, this Note concludes that, despite the dissent's erroneous contention that trash cans are containers supporting a reasonable expectation of privacy, the dissent accurately resolved the fundamental issue by concluding that society believes citizens may reasonably expect that the contents of their garbage bags will not be searched and seized without a warrant.
II.

STATE BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 4 The Supreme Court has traditionally held that warrantless searches "are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 5 In Greenwood, the Supreme Court expanded the exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit the warrantless search of an individual's garbage. 6 Greenwood came before the Court as a result of the unique posture of the California Supreme Court in excluding evidence obtained as a result of warrantless trash searches. Before Greenwood, California was one of two states that had invalidated warrantless trash searches as violative of the fourth amendment. 7 In 1971, the California Supreme Court concluded that a warrantless search of the contents of a defendant's trash barrel was an illegal search and seizure in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights. 8 In Krivda, the court held that an individual has a "reasonable expectation that [his or her] trash would not be rummaged through and picked over by police officers acting without a search warrant." 9 The Krivda court accordingly suppressed the evidence obtained from the illegal garbage search.
10
In response to the State's petition for a writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court remanded Krivda to the California 4 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. [T] he Supreme Court has frequently interpreted the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment so as to make searches under warrants the rule and warrantless searches the exception"). Exceptions to the warrant requirement include: searches incident to a valid arrest, "consent searches, emergency searches, searches of vehicles stopped in transit, seizures under the plain view doctrine, searches and seizures in open fields, and seizures of abandoned prop-Supreme Court to establish whether the lower court's holding was based on federal or state grounds. 1 1 On remand, the California Supreme Court explicitly stated that its application of the exclusionary rule to warrantless garbage searches was valid because it was based upon both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and a comparable California constitutional provision.' 2 In 1985, California enacted Proposition 8, which disallowed the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the California constitution.1 3 Shortly thereafter, the California Court of Appeals faced a similar issue in People v. Rooney.1 4 In Rooney, the appellate court refused to consider evidence obtained in a trash search on the ground that Krivda clearly held that warrantless searches of trash without probable cause violated both the California and federal constitutions.' 5 The California Supreme Court denied review, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 6 However, the Supreme Court subsequently dismissed its grant of certiorari in Rooney as improvidently granted.' 7 The Court concluded that the procedural posture of Rooney was such that the search and seizure issue was not properly presented to the California Supreme Court for review.' 8 Instead, the Court observed that "[g]iving the California Supreme Court an opportunity to consider the issue in a case that properly raises it is a compelling reason for us to dismiss this petition."' 19 The California Supreme Court was afforded the opportunity to review its Krivda holding when the State appealed the appellate On February 23, the same neighbor notified Stracner that a second large rental truck was parked in front of Greenwood's home. Stracner and an Orange County Sheriff's investigator responded by going to the location with a dog trained to detect narcotics and conducted a canine "sniff search," which yielded negative results. Later on February 23, Stracner and the investigator followed the truck to another residence, which Stracner learned had previously been investigated as a narcotics trafficking location. When Stracner and additional officers executed the warrant on the evening of April 6, they observed Greenwood, Van Houten and another woman through the glass front doors of Greenwood's home. 3 7 When the officers knocked and announced their purpose, Greenwood fled upstairs and one of the women ran out of view. 3 8 The officers repeated their announcement and, hearing no answer, forcibly entered the house. 3 9 The officers' subsequent search yielded quantities of cocaine and hashish, and Greenwood, Van Houten and the other woman were arrested. 40 Later, Stracner told Investigator Robert Rahaeuser of her findings and Greenwood's arrest. 4 1 On three separate occasions during April and May of 1984, Greenwood's neighbor again complained about continuing late-night traffic in front of Greenwood's home, this time speaking to Rahaeuser. 4 2 On May 3, an officer travelled to Greenwood's home on an unrelated noise complaint and reported to Rahaeuser that the woman he spoke with seemed quite nervous, while several others within Greenwood's home peeked out from behind the draperies. 43 The following day, Rahaeuser observed a man bringing garbage to the front of Greenwood's home, presumably for collection. 4 4 Following Stracner's procedure, Rahaeuser obtained the trash from the garbage collector and searched through the bags, again discovering evidence of drug trafficking. 4 5 Greenwood and Van Houten were arrested and charged with felony narcotics possession on the basis of the contraband discovered during the executions of the two search warrants. 46 However, the appellate court concluded that, without the'evidence obtained in the trash searches, the State had no probable cause on which to issue the warrants. 4 7 Greenwood and Van Houten moved to set aside the information on the ground that the warrants and resultant discoveries were the product of the original, illegal trash searches.
48
The magistrate at the preliminary hearing upheld the warrants, but the superior court granted the defendants' motion to suppress the evidence obtained under the warrants on the basis of the California Supreme Court's holding in Krivda, which invalidated warrantless trash searches as violative of the fourth amendment. 4 9 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court holding, 50 Justice White dismissed Greenwood's contention that he had demonstrated an expectation of privacy worthy of fourth amendment protection regarding the garbage that was searched by Stracner and Rahaeuser. 5 7 The Court noted that, while Greenwood had placed his trash in opaque plastic bags on the street for collection at "a fixed time" and may have expected his garbage to be "mingle [d] with the trash of others, and deposited at the garbage dump," such an expectation does not result in fourth amendment protection "unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable." 5 8
The Court concluded that, by placing his garbage in plastic bags near a public street and thereby rendering it "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public," ' 5 9 Greenwood "exposed [his] garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat [his] claim to Fourth Amendment protection." 60 Justice White observed that Greenwood brought his garbage to the curb "for the express purpose of conveying it to ... the trash collector," who might himself have sifted through the refuse or, as happened, permit other parties (such as police officers) to do so. 61 The Court reasoned that Greenwood had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his incriminating trash because he deposited it by his curb, an area "particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having others take it." ' 62 Justice White continued by observing that because Greenwood had exposed his garbage to the public, the police officers could not reasonably be expected to avoid seeing "evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public." 63 The Court went on to discuss its denial of fourth amendment prowhether a search invades a constitutionally protected "private area": "[F]irst... a person [has] exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.'" Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
57 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
58
Id. 59 Id. at 1628-29 (citations omitted). Justice White cited anecdotal illustrations involving various types of characters, ranging from an errant canine to a "[r]ich lady from Westmont," who "make use of others' refuse. tection to telephone numbers dialed by a criminal suspect. 64 Justice White analogized the dialing of a telephone with the placing of garbage by a curb for collection and concluded that in both cases, the individual "voluntarily conveys" information to third parties, either to the telephone company simply by using the telephone or to the trash collector by leaving garbage for pick-up. 
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duct warrantless searches of trash "discarded in-public areas."°7 0 In a footnote, the Court tersely observed that since "the dissenters are among the tiny majority ofjudges whose views are contrary to ours, we are distinctly unimpressed with the dissent's prediction that 'society will be shocked to learn' of today's decision."
The Court next rejected Greenwood's contention that because the warrantless search of his garbage was impermissible as a matter of California law, 7 2 his expectation of privacy in his trash should be found reasonable as a matter of federal constitutional law and protected by the fourth amendment. 73 Justice White reiterated the Court's view that societal understanding, not state law, determines whether a search is invalid under the fourth amendment, and emphasized that in the instant case, the Court had already determined that "society as a whole possesses no such understanding with regard to garbage left for collection at the side of a public street." 74 Justice White concluded the opinion of the Court by dismissing Greenwood's argument that Proposition 8 7 5 violates due process.
The Court observed that even though the Krivda holding recognized a citizen's "right to be free from warrantless searches of garbage," Justice Brennan dismissed the notion that Greenwood's expectation of privacy is less reasonable because he used the bags to dispose of, rather than to transport, his belongings. 9 3 The dissent observed that a garbage bag is " 'a common repository for one's personal effects' "94 and its contents reveal intimate details about its owner's personal habits. 9 5
The dissent attacked the majority's use of federal and state court precedent in demonstrating the widespread acceptability of unwarranted trash searches. Justice Brennan observed that, of the eleven federal court decisions cited by the majority, "at least two are factually or legally distinguishable ... and seven rely entirely or almost entirely on an abandonment theory ... Finally, Justice Brennan argued that a "reasonable expectation" of privacy in one's sealed trash containers is an understanding shared by society. 98 For example, he cited the public criticism surrounding a reporter who searched through Henry Kissinger's trash 9 9 and municipal ordinances that prohibit unauthorized persons from searching through garbage cans.' 0 0
The dissent explained that the fourth amendment does not protect objects which have already become public, such as trash that has 
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been strewn on the sidewalk. The dissent contended that the majority's reliance on Greenwood's conveyance of the trash to the garbage collector is unpersuasive. First, Justice Brennan noted that Greenwood had no alternative under county ordinance' 0 3 but to leave his trash at his curb for removal. 1 0 4 Second, the dissent observed that if "voluntary relinquishment" was, as the majority appears to indicate, dispositive of the privacy issue, "a letter or package would lose all Fourth Amendment protection when placed in a mail box or other depository with the 'express purpose' of entrusting it to the postal officer or a private carrier."' 1 5 Justice Brennan concluded that such a result is inconsistent with long-standing Court precedent. 1 0 6 Justice Brennan closed his dissent by remarking that the majority opinion paints a grim picture of our society.... [as one] in which local authorities may command their citizens to dispose of their personal effects... and then monitor them arbitrarily and without judicial oversight-a society that is not prepared to recognize as reasonable an individual's expectation of privacy in the most private of personal effects sealed in an opaque container designed to commingle it imminently and inextricably with the trash of others. The American society with which I am familiar "chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance," and is more dedicated to individual liberty and more sensitive to intrusions on the sanctity of the home than the Court is willing to acknowledge. In Katz, the Court held that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's placement of an electronic listening device on the wall of a public telephone booth without a warrant constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment. 110 The Katz majority explained that: the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."'I
In Greenwood, Justices White and Brennan agreed that Justice Harlan's two-pronged test is the proper standard for determining whether a search violates the fourth amendment.
1 2 Justices White and Brennan agreed further that Greenwood fulfilled the first prong of the Katz test because he manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in his garbage. 1 3 Instead, the debate between the Greenwood majority and dissent centered upon whether an individual's expectation of privacy in his or her garbage is socially reasonable.
Applying 
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that Greenwood failed to demonstrate an expectation of privacy worthy of fourth amendment protection. 1 4 Justice White reasoned that Greenwood was unable to meet the second prong of the Katz inquiry because society does not accept an expectation of privacy in one's trash as "objectively reasonable." ' 1 5 Justice White explained that Greenwood's privacy expectation was not protected because Greenwood placed his garbage bags where they were vulnernable to the possible intrusions of "animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public." ' 1 6 Furthermore, Justice White added that Greenwood's trash collector "might himself have sorted through [the] trash" or, as happened, allowed the police to do so. 117 Justice White's reasoning indicates that he believes the Katz social reasonableness inquiry is answered by examining whether an individual's privacy expectation is currently subject to invasion. By stressing the likelihood of Greenwood's privacy actually being invaded, Justice White framed the Katz inquiry in pragmatic terms of actual probabilities.
The Greenwood dissent sharply criticized Justice White's probablistic justification for concluding Greenwood's expectation was not "reasonable." Arguing that the mere chance that uninvited scavengers might rifle through the sealed trash bags does not eliminate privacy expectations any more than the chance of a malevolent intrusion diminishes one's expectation of privacy in his or her home, 8 Therefore, regardless of the veracity ofJustice Brennan's presumption that most individuals believe garbage reconnaissance is ethically repugnant, Justice White's Greenwood opinion implies that a majority of the Court is unwilling to implement a standard of social reasonableness that encompasses societal beliefs; instead, in determining whether an individual's expectation of privacy is reasonable, the Court examines how members of society actually behave.
B. THE FALLACY OF GARBAGE BAGS AS CONTAINERS SUPPORTING A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
In his Greenwood dissent, Justice Brennan shifted away from individual and societal beliefs and behavior and argued that a reasonable expectation of privacy may be discerned from the nature of the container the individual uses to store his or her garbage. Justice Other commentators have criticized similar exposs of celebrities' garbage. For example, in an article describing the importance of protecting expectations of privacy in trash, the authors decribe how one journalist "surreptitiously snatched trash from the garbage cans of various celebrities" and published photographs of his findings with interpretive descriptions of the stars' reading habits, finances and social lives. Bush 
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Brennan contended that the contents of Greenwood's sealed, opaque trash bags should not have been searched on the ground that they were containers which can support a reasonable expectation of privacy.' 2 4 Justice Brennan cited long-standing Court precedent to support his contention that "so long as a package is 'closed against inspection,' "125 it may not be searched without a warrant. 1 2 6
Justice Brennan reasoned that the Court has recently reaffirmed this principle and rejected any distinction between containers "worthy" and "unworthy" of fourth amendment protection. the Court, relying on the "virtually unanimous agreement in Robbins ... that a constitutional distinction between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' containers would be improper," held that a distinction among "paper bags, locked trunks, lunch buckets, and orange crates" would be inconsistent with "the central purpose of the Fourth Amendment....
[A] traveler who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf [may] claim an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attach6 case." As Justice Stewart stated in Robbins, the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of "every container that conceals its contents from plain view.
9
Justice Brennan's reliance upon Ross to support his argument that an opaque, closed container creates a per se right to fourth amendment protection is both misplaced and misleading. The holding in Ross directly contradicts this view by permitting the warrantless search of "compartments and containers" within an automobile legitimately stopped by police officers if the officers have probable cause to believe that contraband may be concealed within the automobile, even if "[the container's] contents are not in plain view." ' 30 Furthermore, Justice Brennan's quoted excerpts from the Ross opinion ignore or simply fail to include explanatory statements that contradict his conclusion.13 For example, while emphatically 124 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1632-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 125 Id. at 1632 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733 (1878)). 126 Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) . 127 Id. at 1632-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 128 456 U.S. 798 (1982) . 129 Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1633 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 822-23) (emphasis added by Justice Brennan).
130 Ross, 456 U.S. at 800. Justice Brennan's extensive citation of the Ross majority opinion is particularly puzzling because he and Justice Marshall dissented from that opinion. At the time the Ross majority rendered its decision, Justice Brennan joined in Justice Marshall's admonition that "[t]he majority today not only repeals all realistic limits on warrantless automobile searches, it repeals the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement itself." Id. at 827 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131 In his Greenwood dissent, Justice Brennan ignored the following footnote that ap-[Vol. 79 quoting the Ross majority's statement that "the Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain view," 13 2 Justice Brennan failed to include its subsequent qualification: "But the protection afforded by the Amendment varies in different settings."
13 3
In light of the Court's unwillingness to distinguish between the traveller who carries his or her belongings in a wrapped bandana or an executive with expensive luggage, 134 Justice Brennan may have been correct in observing that Greenwood would have had a fourth amendment right to privacy in his garbage bags had he been carrying them.1 3 5 However, Justice Brennan failed to adequately support his declaration that Greenwood was entitled to the same degree of protection even though he used the bags to dispose of, rather than transport, his "personal effects."' 1 6 In contrast to the general intuitive thrust of his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan's arguments on the container issue did not address the fundamentally different ways in which a person subjectively perceives the contents of his or her garbage can versus the contents of his or her luggage. 13 7 peared in Ross that discusses the distinction between "worthy" and "unworthy" containers:
If the distinction is based on the proposition that the Fourth Amendment protects only those containers that objectively manifest an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy, however, the propriety of a warrantless search neccessarily would turn on much more than the fabric of the container. A paper bag stapled shut and marked "private" might be found to manifest a reasonable expectation of privacy, as could a cardboard box stacked on top of two pieces of heavy luggage. The propriety of the warrantless search seemingly would turn on an objective appraisal of all the surrounding circumstances. Ross, 456 U.S. at 822 n.30. 'inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy.'" Id. at 1634 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (the contents of a small, unlocked suitcase are protected by the fourth amendment)).
137 For example, generally no one wishes to be reunited with his or her garbage after a trash collector removes it from his or her possession. In contrast, virtually every traveller hopes to be reunited with his or her luggage after surrendering it to a baggage handler.
C. THE UNSPOKEN ROLE OF ABANDONMENT IN DETERMINING WHETHER GARBAGE RECONNAISSANCE IS SOCIALLY
UNREASONABLE
Though the Greenwood majority did not directly address whether Greenwood's expectation of privacy was socially unreasonable because he deposited his garbage on the curb with the intent of never seeing it again, Justice White had earlier discussed the application of the abandonment theory to justify warrantless garbage searches in his dissenting opinion in California v. Rooney.1 3 8 While the similarities between his Rooney dissent and Greenwood opinion are illuminating, 13 9 the most telling aspect of the Rooney dissent appears to be what Justice White failed to incorporate into his Greenwood opinion; specifically, his explicit rejection of the theory of abandonment as a method of determining whether an individual has a socially recognized reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her garbage. 140
In dispensing with the abandonment argument in Rooney, Justice White reasoned that:
Rooney's property interest ... does not settle the matter for Fourth Amendment purposes, for the reach of the Fourth Amendment is not determined by state property law. . . . The primary object of the Fourth Amendment is to protect privacy, not property, and the question.., is not whether Rooney had abandoned his interest in the property law sense, but whether he retained a subjective expectation of privacy in his trash bag that society accepts as objectively reasonable. 141 However, the text of Justice White's Greenwood opinion contains no 138 107 S. Ct. 2853 Ct. (1987 . Rooney involved the warrantless search of an individual's garbage bag placed in a communal trash bin in an apartment complex. Id. at 2853. Justice White contended that the Rooney search did not violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights because "society is not prepared to accept as reasonable an expectation of privacy in trash deposited in an area accessible to the public." Id. at 2862 (White, J., dissenting). See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
139 Justice White recited some passages from his Rooney dissent almost verbatim in Greenwood. Compare Rooney, 107 S. Ct. at 2859 (White, J., dissenting)("It is common knowledge that trash bins and cans are commonly visited by animals, children, and scavengers looking for valuable items") with Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628-29 ("It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accesible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops and other members of the public.")(footnotes omitted).
Furthermore, Justice White employed many of the same citations in Greenwood that he had previously used in his Rooney dissent. Both Greenwood, 108 S. Ct 
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14 2
The Greenwood dissent did not attack Justice White's failure to acknowledge his earlier rejection of the abandonment theory. Instead, Justice Brennan quoted Justice White's Rooney dissent and presumed that the Greenwood majority adhered to Justice White's earlier logic and "properly reject[ed]" the state's abandonment argument.14 3 Nonetheless, Justice Brennan observed that the vast majority of the state and federal court opinions Justice White cited to support his contention that "society would not accept as reasonable [a] claim to an expectation of privacy in trash left for collection in an area accessible to the public"' 144 relied upon the theory that garbage placed for collection was abandoned property and therefore not protected by the fourth amendment.
14 5 Justice Brennan's criticism indicates that, after Greenwood, the theory of abandonment has an unspoken role in determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her garbage. However, the Greenwood majority was unwilling or unable to delineate the dimensions of this role. While his Greenwood opinion is silent on the abandonment issue, Justice White implicitly endorsed the abandonment rationale in However, Justice White edited the text of the Reicherter quotation to delete the court's reliance upon the abandonment principle.
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The Greenwood majority inexplicably failed to justify or condemn the view that an expectation of privacy in garbage is not protected by the fourth amendment because the garbage is abandoned property. Justice White could have eliminated this confusion and incorporated abandonment into the Katz criterion of social reasonableness by referring to the Court's previous observation that property rights reflect society's recognition of an owner's right to exclude others, and that "one who owns or lawfully possesses or A mere recitation of the contention carries with it is own refutation. Every circuit considering the issue has concluded that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists once trash has been placed in a public area for collection. The reasoning underlying these decisions is clear and persuasive. As stated by the Seventh Circuit in Shelby: "The placing of trash in garbage cans at a time and place for anticipated collection by public employees for hauling to a public dump signifies abandonment." Having placed the trash in an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it, it is inconceivable that the defendant intended to retain a privacy interest in the discarded objects. Reicherter, 647 F.2d at 399 (citations omitted). controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude." 15 0
The Greenwood Court affords little guidance to state tribunals in explaining why an individual has no socially recognized reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her garbage. 15 1 If the cases decided shortly after Greenwood indicate the course of future state court decisions, the most compelling explanation lies in Justice White's reasoning that a citizen who places his or her trash out for collection forfeits any claim to a reasonable expectation of privacy because he or she "voluntarily" conveys the garbage to the trash collector. Prior to Greenwood, the Court applied the Katz reasonableness test in a series of cases that find a voluntary conveyance of information to third parties automatically precludes any protection of that information under the fourth amendment. In Smith v. Maryland, 153 the Court employed the Katz rationale to reject a petitioner's claim that the warrantless placement of a pen register to record numbers dialed from his home telephone violated his fourth amendment rights.1 54 Writing for the Smith majority, Justice Blackmun observed that it is unlikely "people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial."' 15 5 Justice Blackmun emphasized that "[a]ll telephone users realize that they must convey phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed," and noted that most people are aware that the phone company records numbers dialed "for a variety of legitimate business purposes." 156 The Court concluded that, even if a person believes the telephone numbers he or she dials will remain private, such a subjective expectation is not within the Katz criterion of "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable,' "157 because Supreme Court precedent dictates that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties."' ' 5 8 Justice Blackmun explained that one who uses a telephone "exposes" the numbers he or she dials to phone company equipment and therefore "assume[s] the risk that the company [will] reveal to police the numbers he dialed." 15 9 Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall dissented from the Smith majority on the ground that such a conveyance is not truly voluntary. 60 Justice Marshall explained that "[i]mplicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice .... It is idle to speak of assuming risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no realistic alternative."' 16 The Greenwood majority's use of the "voluntary conveyance" principle is vulnerable to similiar criticism. An individual who wishes to keep his or her trash reasonably private may be hardpressed for alternatives to "voluntarily" conveying his or her trash to the garbage collector. For example, local statutes prohibited Greenwood from burning, burying, or amassing his trash within his home 16 2 and, though no such law was described in Greenwood, some local governments prohibit citizens from disposing of their own garbage. 163 While an individual who wishes to keep a document private might shred the paper into tiny, indistinguishable pieces, other items one might wish to keep secret, such as contraceptive containers and prescription bottles, are not readily destructible.
Under the Greenwood holding, a person who complies with the laws of his or her community by depositing sealed bags of garbage on the curb for collection voluntarily reveals whatever "secrets" that trash may contain to the mercy and discretion of the garbage collector or, in jurisdictions that do not prohibit unauthorized tampering with garbage, anyone who happens to walk by. The Greenwood majority failed to acknowledge that if a citizen must break the law to avoid voluntarily exposing the contents of his or her garbage can to public scrutiny, the crux of the issue is compulsion, not consent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Greenwood decision is a disturbing and confusing manifestation of the Court's continuing emasculation of the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. The core issue in Greenwood was neatly framed by the two-pronged Katz test. Because it was clear that Greenwood subjectively believed the contents of his garbage bags would remain private, the essential inquiry in determining if the search was constitutionally permissible was whether society accepts that privacy expectation as reasonable.
The Greenwood majority's conclusion that an expectation of privacy in trash is not socially reasonable is based upon two unsettling propositions. First, by arguing that the contents of an individual's garbage bags should not be accorded privacy rights because such bags are sometimes invaded, 64 the Court rests constitutional safeguards on the capricious actions of particular individuals. For example, taken literally, the Greenwood majority's analysis could support the position that the information contained in computer networks is no longer private in light of recent episodes of interception and tampering by third parties. Second, to support its conclusion that garbage placed along the curb for collection may be searched without a warrant, the majority used a false, hollow notion of voluntary conveyance to characterize a transaction between citizen and trash collector that is often mandated by local ordinance. Furthermore, the Greenwood majority opinion is confusing because the Court made an assertion about societal beliefs while shrouding its conclusion in legal precedent. 166 The Greenwood majority contended that the vast majority of lower federal and state courts agreed with its conclusion that society does not recognize as reasonable an individual's expectation of privacy in the contents of his or her garbage cans, but Justice White refused to acknowledge that a concept of property law, not societal understanding, was the dispositive factor governing most of these decisions.
In contrast, the Greenwood dissent directly answered Katz' social reasonableness inquiry. Omitting his flawed attempt to equate garbage bags with containers such as suitcases and mailing envelopes, Justice Brennan's opinion clearly stated his contention that society, as an aggregate of individuals, believes that the contents of a person's trash container can and should remain private. 1 6 7 Whether his contention about societal belief is right or -wrong, at least Justice Brennan's dissent addressed Katz' fundamental inquiry about societal understanding in lucid, candid terms. White.
